Lex专栏：内幕交易“好景”不再
Lex专栏：内幕交易“好景”不再
Lex专栏(Lex)
从事内幕交易的人，日子曾经很好过。他们或许会因行为失端在民事法庭遭到轻微惩罚，最坏的情况也不过是处以罚款或吊销职业资格。即便有关部门获得刑事法庭立案的权力，立案起诉的也是微乎其微。
如今情况在变。立案和定罪都在大幅增加——这是多年来市场监管者们互不相让，竞相证明谁最铁腕的结果。对冲基金公司GLG Partners刚输掉针对法国市场监管机构的上诉，该机构指责该公司就维旺迪(Vivendi)股票进行内幕交易。英国金融服务管理局(FSA)也在着手一宗刑事审判，接着今年可能还会有四起。上周，香港进行了首例刑事起诉。法国巴黎银行(BNP Paribas)原来的一位银行家因向朋友与家人泄露一起即将进行的收购，目前面临高达10年监禁和最高130万美元罚款。
银行从业人员薪资引起民愤，说明现在正是追究白领败类的绝好时机。监管层的热情高涨了，但市场更干净到什么程度仍值得探讨。隐藏在委托代名人、离岸公司和其它代理人背后的恶人仍可逃脱监察。波动的市场可掩盖各种欺诈行为。除了合理怀疑之外，证明其犯罪意图仍十分困难。
理论上，更遵守规矩的市场应能降低资本的成本。但内幕交易确实对市场造成损害的证据仍显得模棱两可。在上世纪大举加强监管前，各种类型的内幕交易都被人有意忽略了。米尔顿·弗里德曼(Milton Friedman)甚至赞成内幕交易，理由是这会迅速将新信息导入市场。而法规仍旧含混不清：试探机构客户对即将进行的融资产生兴趣在什么阶段变成阴谋？不过，杀鸡儆猴的做法肯定会令其他人有所收敛。
Lex专栏是由FT评论家联合撰写的短评，对全球经济与商业进行精辟分析
译者/红岭
INSIDER TRADING
Lex
Insider traders used to have it easy. They might suffer a slap on the wrist at a civil misconduct tribunal; at worst, a fine or a professional disqualification. Even when authorities won the right to pursue cases through criminal courts, prosecutions were exceptional events.
That is now changing. Cases and convictions are mounting – the result of years of one-upmanship from market watchdogs, competing to prove they are the toughest of them all. Hedge fund GLG Partners just lost an appeal against the French market regulator for insider trading in Vivendi shares. The UK's FSA has one criminal trial under way, with perhaps another four to follow this year. Hong Kong this week saw its first criminal prosecution. An ex-BNP Paribas banker now faces up to 10 years in jail – and a fine of up to $1.3m – for tipping off friends and family about an upcoming buy-out.
As the furore over bankers' pay demonstrates, this is a good time to be pursuing white-collar scoundrels. But to what extent the increased zeal of regulators will create cleaner markets is debatable. Miscreants can still escape detection by lurking behind nominees, offshore companies and other proxies. Volatile markets can mask all kinds of skulduggery. Proving intent, beyond reasonable doubt, remains tough.
In theory, cleaner markets should bring down the cost of capital. But evidence that insider trading actually harms markets is equivocal. Before the tide of regulation was unleashed in the last century, trading by all kinds of insiders was studiously ignored. Milton Friedman even approved, on the grounds that it quickly introduced new information to the market. And rules are still riddled with ambiguity: at what stage does sounding out interest among institutional clients for a forthcoming financing turn sinister? Still, more heads on spikes will certainly discourage others.
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