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外资银行与龙共舞
作者：英国《金融时报》 森迪普•塔克, 吉密欧 2009-07-07 (www.ftchinese.com)

四年前，当美国银行(BofA)为入股中国建设银行(China Construction Bank)进行谈判时，安排该笔投资的顾问们给项目取名为：“足金项目”(Project Solidgold)。

但令人瞩目的是，美中这两家银行间里程碑式的“战略”关系未能闪耀金光。近几周，包括美国银行在内，一系列海外金融机构在锁定期满后，立即减持了中资银行股份。

套现离场的做法激怒中国

这些售股之举在很大程度上是由外资银行亟需资金所推动，但它们激怒了中国，从而引发人们担心，未来多年里，海外银行在中国金融服务市场可获得的发展空间将因此受到限制。

摩根大通国际(JPMorgan Chase International)总裁、国际清算银行(Bank for International Settlements，央行家的银行)前总经理安浩德(Andrew Crockett)表示：“那些在入股中资银行时承诺帮助其改善风险管理、而后却套现离场的机构，在中国将不会得到正面看待”。

一些银行在减持的基础上更进一步。今年1月份，英国的苏格兰皇家银行(RBS)将所持中国银行(Bank of China)价值24亿美元的股份全部抛售，以筹集资金，该行目前还在出售其在华零售和商业银行业务。

银行家以及北京、上海两地的官员警告称，这种180度大转弯的后果是，苏格兰皇家银行等机构若想在日后重返中国市场，它们将很难重新获得昔日的地位。中国将在未来10年内成为全球最重要的银行业市场之一。的确，在中国建立强大的地盘，很可能会决定哪一家机构将在下一批真正全球化的金融机构中脱颖而出。

2005年至2006年间，美国银行、苏格兰皇家银行、瑞银(UBS)以及花旗集团(Citigroup)等机构总共投入数十亿美元购买中国最大几家银行的股份。当时，中国国有的银行体系在理论上处于资不抵债状态，银行坏账缠身，放贷实践过时。

中国官方的思路是，引入海外投资者，会有助于对国内银行进行资本重组，实现风险管理的现代化，并在各大银行进行首次公开发行(IPO)前提振市场人气。

当时，外资零售银行——即便是像汇丰(HSBC)这样在亚太地区根基深厚的银行——不被允许在中国内地注册成立法人银行，这严重制约了它们向企业和零售客户提供本币产品的能力。在它们看来，对中资银行的投资是在信用卡等领域进行合资的据点，有助于它们将触角伸向数千万新客户。

中资银行囊括全球前三家市值最大银行

但随后爆发了西方世界的金融危机，行业格局经历了一次最彻底的洗牌。如今，全球市值最大的3家银行均为中资银行。华尔街、伦敦和苏黎世的金融巨擎们遭遇挫折，无论它们现在试图提供什么，北京都兴味索然。

“人们从一开始就过高估计了那些交易的战略意义，”董乐明(Lonnie Dounn)表示，他曾在汇丰银行亚太区供职，但在2005年被任命为中国银行信贷风险总监，成为在中国顶级银行担任高层管理职务的首名外籍人士。已经离开中行的董乐明说：“中资银行不愿让外资银行染指自己的最优质客户，而外资银行在进入中国市场时，也没有明确的战略”。

不过，虽然战略元素基本上只是幻觉，但这些交易的确有利于双方。外国投资者获得了三倍于初期投入的可观账面利润，中资银行则全部成功上市。2006 年10月，存款额为全球第一的中国工商银行(ICBC)在香港和上海两地同时上市，融资220亿美元，至今仍保持着首次公开发行的世界纪录。

工行的基石投资者是高盛(Goldman Sachs)、美国运通(American Express)和德国保险公司安联(Allianz)。上月，高盛以19亿美元售出所持5%工行股份的五分之一。此前5周，美国运通与安联分别脱手一半股份，总融资额与高盛相当。美国银行以100亿美元出售了10%的建行股份，它仍持有10%的股份，多数必须持有到2011年。

外资银行仅占中国银行业总资产2.2%

那么，北京的不满，或者更进一步说，公众对西式银行实践的失望，是否会给那些仍热衷于在中国发展的海外机构的大环境带来负面影响？2006年12 月，外资银行终于获准在中国成立法人银行。这一身份的改变——目前已有26家银行获得法人身份——使它们得以通过在华子公司提供零售银行服务。目前，外资银行仅占中国银行业总资产的2.2%，尽管这一比例在大城市要高一些，并且正在缓慢上升。

汇丰和花旗等银行已建立起分行网络，分别拥有大约40个网点，集中于几个最大的中心城市。苏格兰皇家银行等机构则选择设立信用卡和理财等业务的合资企业，以此促进业务增长。不过，此类合资的结果喜忧参半，业内人士称，合资双方都在怀疑对方动机。

咨询公司麦肯锡(McKinsey)驻香港高级合伙人姚万里(Emmanuel Pitsilis)表示：“外资银行用来打入亚洲零售银行市场的两件传统武器——财富管理和信用卡——在中国用起来都比较困难”。在许多中国人看来，把家庭财产委托给一家外资资金管理公司，仍然是一种太冒险的做法。而危机爆发后，西方银行为鼓励富人拱手交出资产而设计的各类产品，不仅吸引力大打折扣，可获得性也显著下降。

中国人不愿当“卡奴”

中国缺乏社保福利体系，储蓄率居高不下，因为人们要准备支付意外的医疗和教育开支。每月不还清信用卡余额的人相对较少，因为人们不愿支付高额的利息费。绝大多数中国人更愿意使用借记卡，这正合那些拥有众多网点的国内银行的心意，因为它们可以收取借记卡年费。苏格兰皇家银行等机构曾预测，10年内将有数亿人用上信用卡，现在看来，这一预测非常不现实。

外资投行在中国打开局面的道路也充满坎坷。直到不久前，只有高盛和瑞银获准运营合资证券公司，这类公司可承揽股票交易和首次公开发行等高利润业务。

虽然外资银行在华进展缓慢，但它们仍将中国市场视为一个重要的增长机遇——假定监管体系和市场条件允许其发展。麦肯锡预测，2007年至2012年间，全球金融服务业收入增长的三分之一将来自中国，在6000亿美元的预计增长额中占到近2000亿美元。麦肯锡的姚万里表示：“外资银行若聚焦于利基产品领域或地区，而不是试图与国内银行在规模上较量，可能会获得更大成功。”

公司银行和投行业务仍有利可图

分析师表示，对海外银行来说，与公司及投行业务相关的产品，仍是一个有利可图的利基领域。这些业务能够针对中国大量跨国企业的日常需求提供服务，如现金管理和外汇，国内银行在这些领域的专业技能仍然相对薄弱。

那些受到金融危机重创、随后得到政府纾困的外国机构，包括瑞银、花旗和美国银行，预计短期内不会投入重大资源扩大在华业务。这可能为汇丰、渣打 (Standard Chartered)等竞争对手创造机会，它们建立中国业务的方式被视为有条不紊、且更讲究方式方法。汇丰与交通银行(Bank of Communications)的结盟广受好评，被誉为模范合作关系——汇丰为改善交行的风险管理、营销和技术提供了帮助。

全球银行业的洗牌，令加拿大、澳大利亚、西班牙和意大利的银行在全球拓展方面处于相对有利地位，而这些国家的主要银行目前在中国的业务还少得可怜。美国方面，摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)也被认为是金融危机的“受益者”，尽管该行在中国零售和投行市场的地盘也是有限的。摩根大通的安浩德表示：“我们看好中国的长期表现，但目前我们并不急于行动。……不过，较长期会有一些重大举措。”

不过，摩根大通和西班牙桑坦德银行(Banco Santander)之类机构获准在华壮大的程度，最终取决于北京的政治气候。西方银行体系几近崩溃的经历，没有给中国的政策制定者留下什么好印象。中国银行业最高监管者刘明康最近为英国《金融时报》撰文，将危机归咎于过度杠杆化、金融工程以及注重短期表现的薪酬机制。

中资银行究竟该向西方同行学什么？

汇丰银行前亚太区董事局主席大卫•艾尔敦(David Eldon)表示：“就在四、五年前，中国的各家银行还遭到呵斥，被说得一无是处。如今，它们在问，究竟应该向西方银行学些什么”。在艾尔登领导下，汇丰银行在时隔近50年后重新进入内地市场。

西方银行家预计，危机将令中国官方采取极端谨慎的态度，无论是在准入外资银行方面，还是批准其扩大分行网络和产品种类方面。能够促使监管机构不下重手的唯一因素，是中国本土银行海外扩张的努力可能因对等限制而受阻。中资银行正热衷于扩大自己的全球地盘，以求为跨境贸易服务，这些银行正寻机收购亚洲以及其它地区的小型银行。

同时，上海急切希望把自身塑造为一个全球金融中心，如果没有大量海外金融机构入驻，这一地位将无法实至名归。普华永道(PwC)中国金融服务主管合伙人卓茂文(Mervyn Jacob)表示：“在华外资银行认为，如果上海想要实现成为一个国际金融中心的目标，它们有限的市场份额就必须得到显著提高。”

近月来，作为政府指导的经济刺激努力的一部分，国内银行处于放贷热潮之中，这进一步侵蚀了外资竞争对手在公司信贷等领域的市场份额。尽管经济增长放缓，钢材、房地产和出口等重要行业面临压力，但中国各大银行的资产质量和利润水平仍在上升。

不少人认为，这种美好形势不会维持太久。一些银行家辩称——不管这听上去有多么厚脸皮——尽管北京对“盎格鲁-撒克逊”银行模式的失败难以掩饰窃喜之情，但用不了多久，它也许又会呼吁西方提供资本和专业技能。

译者/章晴
本文的网址：http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001027418
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Exiting the dragon
By Sundeep Tucker, Jamil Anderlini 2009-07-07 (www.ftchinese.com)

When Bank of America was negotiating to take a stake in China Construction Bank four years ago, advisers who worked on the investment gave it the code name “Project Solidgold”.

Yet the landmark “strategic” relationship between the US and Chinese lenders has conspicuously failed to glister. BofA was among a wave of overseas financial institutions that in recent weeks sold down their holdings in their Chinese counterparts as soon as lock-in periods expired.

The stake sales, driven largely by the foreign banks' urgent need for capital, have angered China – prompting fears that the fallout will hamper the scope granted to overseas banks in the mainland financial services market for years to come.

“The institutions that bought stakes in Chinese banks with promises of helping them to improve their risk management, but later crashed out, will not be seen positively in China,” says Andrew Crockett, president of JPMorgan Chase International and former head of the Bank for International Settlements, the central bankers' bank.

Some are going further than simply reducing their holdings. The UK's Royal Bank of Scotland, which in January sold its entire $2.4bn (€1.7bn, £1.45bn) stake in Bank of China to raise capital, is in the process of selling its mainland retail and commercial operations.

Bankers and bureaucrats in Beijing and Shanghai warn that, as a result of the U-turn, groups such as RBS will struggle to regain their positions in the country if in the future they wish to return to what is set to become one of the world's most important banking markets over the next decade. Indeed, building a significant presence in China is likely to be crucial in determining who will be in the vanguard of the next group of truly global financial institutions.

BofA and RBS were among a number, also including UBS and Citigroup, which in 2005 and 2006 together spent tens of billions of dollars accumulating stakes in China's largest banks. The state-owned banking system was technically insolvent and its institutions riddled with bad debts and outmoded lending practices.

Chinese authorities thought allowing in overseas investors would help to recapitalise its banks, modernise risk management and bolster sentiment ahead of planned initial public offerings by the top lenders.

At the time, foreign retail banks – even those with deep roots in the region, such as HSBC – were not permitted to incorporate their mainland operations locally, which severely restricted their ability to offer local currency products to business and individual customers. They saw the investments in domestic banking groups as a bridgehead to joint ventures, in areas such as credit cards, which would help them reach tens of millions of new customers.

But then came the west's financial crisis and the starkest of turnrounds in fortunes. Today the three largest banks in the world by market capitalisation are all Chinese and there is little appetite in Beijing for whatever the humbled giants of Wall Street, London and Zurich are trying to offer.

“The strategic aspect of these deals was always overstated,” says Lonnie Dounn, formerly of HSBC in Asia but who in 2005 was named chief credit officer of Bank of China, becoming the first foreigner to hold a senior executive position at a top mainland lender. “The Chinese banks did not want to give the foreign banks access to their best customers and the foreign banks did not, going in, have clear strategies for the Chinese market,” says Mr Dounn, who is no longer with BoC.

Yet while the strategic element proved largely illusory, the deals did benefit both sides. The foreign investors have made handsome paper gains of up to three times their outlay, while the Chinese lenders each had successful stock market listings. Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, now the world's biggest bank by deposits, raised $22bn in a dual listing in Hong Kong and Shanghai in October 2006 – which remains a world record for an IPO.

ICBC's cornerstone investors were Goldman Sachs, American Express and Allianz, the German insurer. Goldman last month sold one-fifth of its 5 per cent holding for $1.9bn, five weeks after Amex and Allianz together raised the same amount by offloading half of their stakes. BofA sold 10 per cent of CCB for $10bn. It retains another 10 per cent, most of which BofA must hold until 2011.

So will Beijing's annoyance, or indeed public disenchantment with western-style banking, negatively affect the wider landscape for overseas institutions that remain keen to grow on the mainland? In December 2006, foreign banks were finally allowed to incorporate locally. This change in status, taken up by 26 banks to date, has allowed them to offer retail banking services through local subsidiaries. Foreign banks at present account for just 2.2 per cent of total nationwide banking assets, although the figure is higher in the bigger cities and is rising slowly.

The likes of HSBC and Citigroup have built branch networks, of around 40 outlets each, concentrated in the largest urban centres. Groups such as RBS opted instead to boost business through joint venture agreements spanning credit cards and wealth management. Such ventures have had mixed results, however, with insiders describing each side as suspicious of the other's motives.

“The two traditional weapons that foreign banks have used to penetrate Asian retail banking markets – wealth management and credit cards – are harder to use in China,” says Emmanuel Pitsilis, Hong Kong-based senior partner of McKinsey, the consultancy. Entrusting family wealth to a foreign money manager remains a leap too far for many Chinese, while the crisis has greatly reduced not only the attraction but also the availability of products engineered by western banks to try and part the wealthy from their assets.

China lacks a welfare safety net and savings rates are high to pay for unforeseen healthcare and education costs. Relatively few fail to pay off their monthly credit card balance, lest they pay high interest charges. The Chinese overwhelmingly prefer debit cards, a position that suits domestic lenders with huge branch networks because they can charge an annual fee for their use. Predictions by bankers at RBS and elsewhere that the take-up of credit cards could reach hundreds of millions within a decade now appear way off the mark.

Foreign investment banks, too, have struggled to make an impact. Until recently only Goldman Sachs and UBS were permitted to operate securities joint ventures able to undertake lucrative stock trading and IPO work.

While progress for foreign banks has been slow, the Chinese market remains a huge growth opportunity for foreign banks – assuming regulations and conditions allow. According to McKinsey, one-third of the increase in global financial services revenue in 2007-12 will come from China, or close to $200bn of the $600bn in estimated growth. “Foreign banks are likely to be more successful in focusing in niche product areas or geographies and not trying to compete on scale with domestic lenders,” says McKinsey's Mr Pitsilis.

Analysts say products relating to corporate and investment banking remain a profitable niche for overseas banks. These include activities that serve the everyday needs of China's army of multinational companies – such as cash management and foreign exchange, areas where domestic expertise remains relatively weak.

Those foreign groups crushed by the financial crisis and rescued by their governments, including RBS, Citi and BofA, are not expected to commit significant resources to expand their China business any time soon. This could open opportunities for rivals such as HSBC and Standard Chartered, which are seen to have built their mainland businesses methodically and in a more disciplined manner. HSBC's tie-up with Bank of Communications is widely hailed as a model partnership, with the western lender helping to improve the mainland bank's risk management, marketing and technology.

The shake-up in the pecking order of global banks has left Canadian, Australian, Spanish and Italian lenders relatively well placed to enlarge their global footprint – and each of those countries' leading banks are woefully under-represented in China. From the US, JPMorgan Chase is also perceived to have had a “good” financial crisis, though it too has a limited presence in mainland's retail and investment banking. “We are bullish on China over the long term but we are not rushing into things at the moment,” says JPMorgan's Mr Crockett. “However, there will be major initiatives in the longer term.”

But how much the likes of JPMorgan or Spain's Banco Santander will be allowed to expand in China ultimately depends on the political mood in Beijing. Policymakers have been left unimpressed by the near-death experience of the western banking system, which Liu Mingkang, the country's top banking regulator, this week in the Financial Times attributed to overleverage, financial engineering and a short-term focus on compensation.

“Just four or five years ago, the Chinese banks were all being shouted at and told they were useless. Now they are asking what they are supposed to learn from western banks,” says David Eldon, former chairman of HSBC in Asia, who oversaw the bank's re-entry to the mainland market after a near 50-year absence.

As a result of the crisis, western bankers expect the Chinese authorities to be ultra-cautious about allowing more foreign banks access to the market or to expand their branch networks or product ranges. The only thing that may prompt regulators to go easy is the danger that the efforts of China's own banks to expand overseas might be frustrated by reciprocal constraints. Chinese lenders are keen to expand their global presence to service cross-border trade and are eyeing acquisitions of small banks in Asia and beyond.

Shanghai is also keen to project itself as a global financial hub, a position it cannot credibly attain without a large presence of overseas financial institutions. “Foreign banks in China hold the view that their limited market share would have to be expanded significantly if Shanghai is to achieve its goal of becoming an international financial centre,” says Mervyn Jacob, PwC's top financial services consultant for China.

Domestic banks have been on a lending splurge in recent months, amid government-directed efforts to stimulate the economy, further eroding the market share of overseas rivals in areas such as corporate loans. Despite slower economic growth and strains in important sectors such as steel, property and exports, top mainland banks boast improving asset quality and profits.

Many believe this rosy scenario cannot be maintained for much longer. Some bankers contend, however cheekily, that while Beijing can barely contain its gloating over the failures of the Anglo-Saxon banking model, it might not be too long before it again calls on the west to provide capital and expertise.
本文的网址：http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001027418